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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH
AFRICA
HUNTER R. CLARK & AMY BOGRAN*
Foreign direct investment ("FDI")** can be like the quality of Por-
tia's mercy: "twice-bless'd."' It can rain high profits on multinational
enterprises. And for host nations, especially developing countries, FDI
can create jobs and capital for new investments, while providing access
to know-how, technology, and lucrative export markets. For these rea-
sons receptivity to FDI has long been a cornerstone of Nelson Mandela's
vision for post-apartheid South Africa's approximately 40 million peo-
ple. As leader of his political group, the African National Congress
("ANC"), Mandela made the importance he attached to FDI clear in an
article he wrote for Foreign Affairs in 1993, the year before he assumed
the South African presidency. Mandela stated:
It is obvious to me that the primary components of our inter-
national economic relations, which must feed our development
strategy, are the strengthening of our trade performance and
our capacity to attract foreign investment. In addition, we
must examine the possibilities of obtaining technical and fi-
nancial assistance from the developed industrialized countries.
We do not expect foreign investment to solve our economic
problems, but we understand it can play a valuable role in our
economic development...
The ANC believes the most important way to attract foreign
investment is to create a stable and democratic political envi-
ronment. Also important is the development of legitimate,
transparent, and consistent economic policies. Foreign com-
panies should be treated as domestic companies, obeying our
laws and gaining access to our incentives, and the ANC is
Hunter R. Clark, Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D., Harvard
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** As used in this article, the term '"oreign direct investment," or "FDI," means
the acquisition of an interest in an enterprise which operates in a state other than that of
which the investor is a national, the investor's purpose being to acquire an effective voice
in how the enterprise is managed.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.
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committed to the principle of uniform treatment. And while
we do not plan to provide exclusive incentives for all foreign
investors, we realize it might be necessary to make special ar-
rangements to attract the kind of investment that will make a
real difference in South Africa. 2
No wonder it seemed as though the world was only waiting for
Mandela to become the official leader of a post-apartheid South Africa
to re-invest in his nation. After all, there are many reasons why South
Africa would appeal to foreign investors. Foremost, South Africa has
the "most powerful economy" on the African continent. 3 According to
the Africa Competitiveness Report 1998, published by the World Eco-
nomic Forum, "South Africa's comparatively open economy (when com-
pared to the rest of Africa) dominates the southern region and the con-
tinent, as a whole. Its $134 billion size is more than twice the size of
any other African economy .... ,,4
Among the many advantages of doing business in South Africa are
that "[i]ts transport and telecommunications infrastructure is unrivaled
on the continent, it produces more electricity than the rest of Africa put
together and it has a third of Africa's telephone lines."5 South Africa is
also rich in mineral resources, including gold, of which it is the world's
leading producer and exporter; coal; chrome; copper; diamonds; iron;
manganese; nickel; silver; and uranium. 6 Moreover, according to the
U.S. Department of State, South Africa's "value-added processing of
minerals to produce ferroalloys, stainless steel, and similar products is
a major industry and an important growth area."7 Also, South Africa's
"diverse manufacturing industry is a world leader in several specialized
sectors, including railway rolling stock, synthetic fuels, and mining
equipment and machinery."8
In addition, there are indications that currency dealers' specula-
tions may have caused the South African rand's undervaluation.9 This
2. Nelson Mandela, South Africa's Future Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AF., Nov.-Dec.
1993, at 86, 95.
3. Victor Mallet, Trade and Investment: An African Renaissance, FIN. TIMES SURV.,
Mar. 24, 1998, at IV.
4. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE AFRICA COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 1998, at 148
(1998).
5. Mallet, supra note 3, at IV.
6. See generally Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, (vis-
ited March 20, 1999), Background Notes: Republic of South Africa, February 1998
<http://www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/southafrica 0298_bgn.html>, at 5 [herein-
after Background Notes] (for a profile of the South African economy); The Africa Competi-
tiveness Report 1998, supra note 4, at 146-49; NEW AFRICAN YEARBOOK 1997-1998 (1998),
at 418-36.
7. Background Notes, supra note 6, at 5.
8. Id.
9. Down with the Rand, THE ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 39. See also Investment in
South Africa, 13 INT'LTRADE REP. 1581, 1613 (1996).
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being the case, investing in South Africa now may be less expensive
than in the future, when the rate might correct itself. Already several
multinational corporations operating in South Africa have started to re-
tool or add the capacity to increase export production. 10 In 1996, the
annual rate of return on South African investments was an appealing
18% to 19%, compared with 14% on investments in Latin America, 12%
to 13% on investments in Asia, and 9% on European investments.11 Re-
cently, the Investor Responsibility Research Center of Washington,
D.C., surveyed the 261 U.S. companies currently doing business in
South Africa. Respondents gave South Africa high marks for its infra-
structure, legal system, supply of raw materials and macroeconomic
management.12
However, despite apartheid's demise and South Africa's re-
acceptance into the world community, it has yet to experience the high
levels of FDI it needs or expects. 13 According to South African finance
minister Trevor Manuel, 1998 saw some 955 international companies
engaged in business in South Africa, with interests in about 2,050 op-
erations. 14 These operations controlled roughly $45 billion in assets,
and employed approximately 380,000 people. 15 But according to the Fi-
nancial Times, the statistics are somewhat misleading. Most of the for-
eign interests and assets in South Africa have been there for many
years, while the "flow of foreign investment into new factories or busi-
nesses remains modest for a market of South Africa's size."' 6
This article will explore some of the reasons why FDI fled South
Africa during the apartheid era; the current status of FDI in South Af-
rica; and how South Africa is today addressing the concerns of present
and prospective foreign investors. Finally, it will analyze why FDI in
South Africa is so necessary and important to that nation, to the Afri-
can continent as a whole, and to the industrialized world.
Historically, South Africa never rejected the ideological premises of
FDI in the way that nations opposed to, or suspicious of, capitalism did.
Vietnam, for example, passed laws expropriating and nationalizing pri-
vate holdings of foreign and domestic individuals and corporations. FDI
was viewed by that nation's leaders as an extension of imperialism and
10. See Investment in South Africa, supra note 9, at 1613.
11. See Gary G. Yerkey, BIT U.S., South Africa Expect to Conclude Investment
Treaty this Year, Aide Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY, May 10, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL
5/10/96 BTD d2.
12. See id.
13. See Asian Investment in South Africa... and the Indian Ocean, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug. 24, 1996, at 52; Investment in Africa: Primary Problems, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 9,
1996, at 95.
14. Victor Mallet, Buoyant Markets Belie Challenges, FIN. TIMES SURV., Mar. 24,
1998, at I.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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hence anathema to socialism and communism. Worse, the expropria-
tions occurred during the decades when Vietnam did not necessarily
recognize a duty to pay restitution.
Today, however, Vietnam has altered its ideology, in part because
of its dire economic circumstances.1 7 Laws have been put in place to
protect and attract FDI, and 25 years after the end of the Vietnam War,
Vietnam has recognized its duty to pay, in full, reparations or restitu-
tion for the expropriated or nationalized property of U.S. citizens.s
Consequently, foreign investors are returning to Vietnam to do business
in the new ways and forms acceptable to that government. 19
In contrast, the problem for South Africa was not that it rejected
FDI. Instead, foreign investors rejected South Africa. Although osten-
sibly committed to the growth-oriented economic policies of free enter-
prise capitalism, South Africa during the apartheid era instituted poli-
cies that were not conducive to FDI. Those policies included extensive
state intervention in the economy; apartheid itself, which created eco-
nomic distortions and political unrest; and a "dual rand" monetary pol-
icy. As one analysis has expressed it:
South African economists in the 1980s described the national
economy as a free-enterprise system in which the market, not
the government, set most wages and prices. The reality was
that the government played a major role in almost every facet
of the economy, including production, consumption, and regu-
lation. In fact, Soviet economists in the late 1980s noted that
the state-owned portion of South Africa's industrial sector was
greater than in any country outside the Soviet bloc. The South
African government owned and managed almost 40 percent of
all wealth-producing assets, including iron and steel works,
weapons manufacturing facilities, and energy-producing re-
sources. Government-owned corporations and parastatals
were also vital to the services sector. Marketing boards and
tariff regulations intervened to influence consumer prices. Fi-
nally, a wide variety of laws governed economic activities at all
levels based on race.20
In an article for the March-April 1996 edition of Foreign Affairs, R.
Stephen Brent, an officer in the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
17. See generally Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order:
Vietnam--A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994) [hereinafter Protection of Foreign
Direct Investment] (discussing the laws and policies of the Vietnamese government re-
garding foreign direct investment).
18. See George Gedda, U.S., Vietnam to Set Diplomatic Link, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 27,
1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 4360298.
19. See Protection of Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 17, at 2009-12.
20. FEDERAL RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY
STUDY 186 (Rita M. Byrnes ed., 3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter LIBRARY OF CONGRESS].
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opment mission in Pretoria, South Africa, assessed South Africa's gov-
ernmental policies and performance under white rule as follows:
Despite South Africa's reputation for a well-run economy un-
der white rule, the policies of the National Party hampered
growth severely. Apartheid brought about international isola-
tion and economic sanctions, but the government's economic
management was also poor. For all its criticisms of the inepti-
tude of African states under black rule to the north, the Na-
tional Party followed policies after 1948 that resembled much
of the rest of Africa. It developed massive bureaucratic and
parastatal structures to provide public employment for Afri-
kaners, many of whom were poor in 1948. It embraced strong
protectionism and import substitution. It spent lavishly on
public investments, especially defense and supposedly strate-
gic industries. And it set up puppet regimes in the so-called
homelands it established that had all the elements of bad gov-
ernance that the National Party criticized: autocracy, patron-
age, corruption, and enormous budget deficits.
These policies did not have the same catastrophic effects as in
other countries, partly because South Africa was trying to sub-
sidize only 15 percent of the population [i.e., the whites] and
had a cushion of vast gold revenues. But the policies did limit
growth. After steady gains in per capita income from 1946 to
1974, income stagnated from 1974 to 1981 and fell by 20 per-
cent from 1981 to 1994. Today South Africa's per capita in-
come of $2,700 is practically what it was in the mid-1960s.21
The institutionalization of apartheid 1948 culminated decades of
racial discrimination and formally created dual economies and societies
within South Africa. Laws like the Group Areas Act of 1950 restricted
the free movement of blacks and "had the effect of zoning all of South
Africa's territory according to race."22 Individual blacks were only al-
lowed to live and work in the areas governed by the tribe or local gov-
ernment of which the individual was officially designated a member.
The residents of these "homeland" areas were often "barely able to sup-
port themselves, owing in part to the homelands' arid land, inferior
roads and transportation, and overcrowding; some were therefore forced
to travel great distances to work in 'white' South Africa."23 Other laws,
such as the Separate Amenities Act of 1953, gave local officials author-
ity to segregate public facilities and accommodations, including
beaches, buses, elevators, hotels, libraries, railway stations, restau-
21. R. Stephen Brent, South Africa: Tough Road to Prosperity, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 1996, at 113-14.
22. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIV., SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY STUDY
240 (Harold D. Nelson ed., 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter FOREIGN AREA STUDIES].
23. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 185.
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rants, telephone booths, theaters, train stations, and the like, thereby
forcing social separation of the races.24
Apartheid proved expensive and unsettling. For one thing, there
was a high cost of maintaining the large security apparatus required to
enforce apartheid. Also, investors grew nervous over brewing social un-
rest. As a result, the government in 1961 found itself faced with a sud-
den deterioration in its balance of payments. The government's re-
sponse was to inhibit the flight of investment capital by imposing a
"dual rand" currency and exchange rate system. 25 The "financial rand"
was defined as "the local proceeds of South African assets owed by per-
sons resident outside of the Republic [of South Africa]."26 In other
words, the financial rand became the currency used by foreigners in-
vesting in government approved ventures.27 The "commercial rand," by
contrast, was made the domestic currency. 28 The financial rand and the
commercial rand were developed to block the easy repatriation of non-
South African owned securities and prevent a run on foreign reserves.29
By separating the currencies, the commercial rand was never affected
by the fluctuation in the discount at which the financial rand traded,
which sometimes was as high as 30%.30
One legal scholar has asserted that the Sharpeville Massacre pre-
cipitated South Africa's 1961 balance of payments crisis. On March 21,
1960 in Sharpeville, a modest township near Johannesburg, South Afri-
can authorities opened fire on anti-apartheid demonstrators gathered
outside a police station to protest apartheid restrictions. According to
Nelson Mandela, "more than seven hundred shots" were directed into a
crowd of several thousand protesters. 31 When the shooting stopped,
"sixty-nine Africans lay dead."32 More than 400 people were wounded,
"including dozens of women and children."3 3 In Mandela's view, "it was
a massacre, and the next day press photos displayed the savagery on
front pages around the world."34 Mandela recalled, "the shootings at
Sharpeville provoked national turmoil and a government crisis."35
Nevertheless, the white society and economy benefited at first from
24. See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22, at 240.
25. See Gary S. Eisenberg, The Policy and Law of Foreign Direct Investment in the
New South Africa 28 J. OF WORLD TRADE 5, 16 (Feb. 1994).
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 16-17.
30. Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 17.
31. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK To FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON
MANDELA 238 (1995).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. MANDELA, supra note 31, at 238.
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governmental support and prospered sufficiently under the apartheid
regime for South Africa to be considered a "middle-income country" by
the World Bank.36 By contrast, the black society and economy suffered
as a consequence of having almost no governmental support. The result
for blacks was massive poverty, unemploynient, and poor education. A
report prepared by the federal research division of the U.S. Library of
Congress in 1987, entitled South Africa: A Country Study, concluded:
By the late 1980s, black poverty was so serious that the gov-
ernment began to take steps to alleviate some of the most dire
impacts of apartheid. Government statistics then indicated
that more than 16 million people were living below interna-
tionally determined minimum-subsistence levels. Using nutri-
tional standards as an alternative measure, an estimated 2.3
million people were at severe risk from hunger and malnutri-
tion. In 1988 the [South African] minister of national health
and population development characterized the crisis as 'worse
than the Great Depression,' and in response, the government
initiated food programs and other social welfare initiatives. 37
By then, the nation's economy had deteriorated badly. "Discrimi-
natory legislation based on race [had] affected the mobility of capital,
the development of enterprises, and internal trade. All of these [had]
retarded economic growth."38 Yet for ideological reasons, South African
whites for years had refused to acknowledge what one observer called
the "basic economic interrelationship of the homelands and the White
area."39 In fact, not until 1980 did the government finally concede that
South Africa's economic well-being depended on integration of the black
and white economies, if not the societies. 40 By that time, however, FDI,
which had been a "major catalyst" in the growth and development of the
South African economy since the late 1800s, had declined signifi-
cantly. 4 1 To outside observers, it began to appear that apartheid, and
the government's inability to quell growing black unrest, was having a
negative influence on foreign investors. 42
36. See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22, at 161.
37. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 186.
38. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22, at 162.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 207.
42. See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, supra note 22.
Between 1973 and 1978 total foreign investment more than doubled.
[T]hrough 1976 the rate of overall growth (public and private sectors,
direct and nondirect investment) was over 20 percent and reached a
high of 29 percent in 1975. The rate dropped sharply in 1977 to 7.6
percent and to 7.3 percent in 1978. Among the factors that appeared
to have played a part in the decline were investor concerns after the
political disturbances in Soweto in 1976....
1999
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Starting in the mid-1970s, throughout the 1980s, and on into the
early 1990s, international trade sanctions and investment boycotts be-
came weapons of choice in the world's war against apartheid. The ef-
fects on South Africa's economy were devastating. As one report re-
counts:
These [trade and investment] measures included a voluntary arms em-
bargo instituted by the United Nations (UN) in 1963, which was de-
clared mandatory in 1977; the 1978 prohibition of loans from the
United States Export-Import Bank; an oil embargo first instituted by
OPEC in 1973 and strengthened in a similar move by Iran in 1979; a
1983 prohibition on IMF loans; a 1985 cutoff of most foreign loans by
private banks; the United States 1986 Comprehensive Antiapartheid
Act, which limited trade and discouraged United States investors; and
the 1986 European Economic Community (EEC) ban on trade and in-
vestment. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also discouraged
trade with South Africa, although observers estimated that [economi-
cally dependent] Africa's officially unreported trade with South Africa
exceeded R10 billion [rand] per year in the late 1980s.
The most effective sanctions measure was the withdrawal of short-term
credits in 1985 by a group of international banks. Immediate loan re-
payments took a heavy toll on the economy. More than 350 foreign
corporations, at least 200 of which were United States owned, sold off
their South African investments. 43
Today, however, South Africa should be very appealing to potential
foreign investors because the country wants FDI, needs it, is amenable
to it, and a democratic government has replaced apartheid. Among
other measures, South Africa has passed new regulations promoting
FDI in public and private partnerships. 44 These include regulations
that reduce tax rates and import tariffs; allow for easier exchange and
repatriation of profits; and which address lagging productivity and the
overall socio-economic difficulties of the black population. Taken to-
gether the government hopes its policies will reduce crime, which has
risen to daunting levels, and increase overall social stability.
To manage the evolution from apartheid to pluralistic democracy, a
transitional Government of National Unity drafted a new constitution,
which became effective on February 4, 1997. 4 5 Through the establish-
ment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the government is at-
tempting to address both the black community's demand for an ac-
Id. at 208.
43. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 20, at 192-93.
44. See Mawusi Afele, Africa Cries Out for Investment, but Will the World Listen?,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 18, 1996, available in WL 7/18/96 DCHPA.
45. New South African Constitution Handed Out Free, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Mar. 17, 1997, at 1, available in WL 3/17/97 DCHPA.
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counting of the human rights violations committed by the apartheid re-
gime, and the white community's fear of retaliation. 46 Even with these
progressive policies, however, the current rate of FDI is disappointing. 47
Pinpointing the reason why is much harder than citing any one set of
statistics or figures. The problem may be more a matter of perception
on the part of prospective foreign investors than of reality. Conse-
quently, as the government is already doing, South Africa can only hope
for the best, give assurances, and continue to address the problems it
knows affect FDI.48
For example, one of the problems is that post-apartheid South Af-
rica inherited one of the most complex tariff systems in the world. 49 By
joining the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in December 1994, the
government agreed to abide by the general goal of reducing or elimi-
nating tariffs. 50 A five-year plan to reduce or eliminate tariffs on most
industrial products began in 1995, giving credibility to South Africa's
commitment to overall tariff reform. 51 There had been some skepticism
about that commitment because of the potentially detrimental effect
tariff reduction and other policies aimed at attracting FDI might have
on the alliance between the ANC and the country's labor unions. 52 For
example, lower tariffs could conceivably put inefficient domestic indus-
tries out of business, thereby increasing the black unemployment rate,
which has reached a staggering 41% overall and is even higher among
young people.5 3 The government, however, achieved a compromise posi-
tion with labor with its five-year plan announced in June 1996. 54 The
government introduced tax breaks for labor intensive industries, and
committed to developing 409,000 jobs by the year 2000. 55
The government also wants to remove all exchange controls "as
soon as circumstances are favorable."56 It has already abolished the
46. See generally Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the
Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 753 (1998).
47. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I.
48. See WILLIAM M. HANNAY & LAUREN G. ROBINSON, Introduction to A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 6-7 (Vaughn C. Williams et al. eds., 1996).
49. See Tani Freedman, Southern African Trade Hobbled by Complex Tariffs, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 23, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 2267308.
50. See Leora Blumberg, Trade Regulation in South Africa, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 48, at 89.
51. See id. at 90.
52. See Mark Ashurst, News: World Trade: Unity of Apartheid's Foes Under Strain,
FIN. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at 4.
53. See Brent, supra note 21, at 114.
54. See Hilfe Country Report: South Africa: July 1995, July 1, 1996, at 18, available
in 1996 WL 11753513 [hereinafter Hilfe Country Report].
55. See id. at 19.
56. Id. at 25.
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double rand system.5 7 South Africa is also expected to remove controls
on foreign investment by its citizens.58 Ensuring the free flow of funds
by eliminating currency controls would more than likely be an "essen-
tial part" of any bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") with the U.S.59 The
policy might also serve to quell the fears of South Africa's white busi-
ness community. If white South Africans know they have the right to
exchange and remove their money from the country, any sense of panic
might ease. Hence they might feel less inclined to actually do so.
South Africa is also seeking to sign tax treaties with several coun-
tries as a further means of attracting FDI. For example, the new tax
treaty with the U.S. provides relief from double taxation and reduces, or
in some cases eliminates, withholding tax on dividends, interest, and
royalties. 60 Other South African tax initiatives include accelerated de-
preciation write-offs and the possibility for up to three, two-year tax
holidays under certain conditions.61
Tax treaties encourage FDI because they allow potential investors
to plan for the consequences of their investment choices. For instance,
if a company knows it will receive a credit or deduction for taxes paid to
the foreign country in which it has a subsidiary, it is more likely to in-
vest in that country than in another nation with which there is no tax
treaty, and the treatment of foreign taxes paid is uncertain. Most of the
countries which compete with South Africa for FDI have entered into
tax treaties with many states. Executing tax treaties, like the one with
the U.S., makes South Africa more competitive with these nations.
To make investment even more attractive, the government has
taken steps to curb the low worker productivity which seems to have
always plagued South Africa. 62 "South Africa's productivity is notori-
ously poor by international standards."6 3 According to Dr. Jan Visser,
executive director of the National Productivity Institute ("NPI"), a
South African consulting firm which each year advises between 500 and
600 companies on how to improve worker output, South Africa's low
productivity "is an organisational issue rather than a national norm."64
Visser explains:
57. See Mandela Looks for Foreign Investors, THE ECONOMIST, May 13, 1995, at 39.
58. See Yerkey, supra note 11.
59. See id. (quoting Dana DuRand, counselor for trade and industry at the South Af-
rican Embassy in Washington, D.C.).
60. See Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and
State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1997, at Al.
61. See generally South Africa-Mozambique-Swaziland: Lubombo Corridor to Cata-
lyze Integration, INT'L MKT. INSIGHT REP., May 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8068620.
62. See Madeleine Wackernagel, at 1, South African Productivity: A National Prior-
ity, AFR. NEWS SERV., Aug. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10503796.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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One of the biggest problems in terms of raising productivity in
this country is the lack of cooperation between management
and unions. They tend to fight, not to support each other.
Strike negotiations are a case in point-a perfect example of
how not to get along. For too long, organizations have set
their sights on creating profits for shareholders, as opposed to
creating wealth that can be shared around more equitably.
65
According to Visser, South African labor and management have
made progress toward a "common goal and a common vision," and to-
ward the introduction of modern labor relations and management tech-
niques. 66 He admitted to an interviewer that South Africa "fell behind
somewhat during the period of isolation ... ."67 He insisted, however,
that South African managers "are taking greater interest in overseas
developments and applying them locally, albeit slowly." 68
In addition, the government is planning ways to make FDI easier
from a logistical standpoint. One plan calls for the creation of "one-
stop" investment facilitation centers where prospective foreign investors
could do everything necessary, such as obtaining licenses and permits,
to start doing business in South Africa immediately and avoid having to
deal with numerous government agencies.69
Another policy is to privatize some, if not most, large state enter-
prises, which should create tremendous FDI opportunities. A prime ex-
ample of the government's resolve to commence privatization has been
the acquisition of an equity partner in Telkom, the state telecommuni-
cations enterprise. According to one report, Telkom's partial privatiza-
tion, by which the South African government relinquished a 30% inter-
est in the parastatal, was motivated by the potential for "reduced
tariffs, extra calls, and higher tax revenues that have followed such
moves in other countries."70 The government is planning more whole or
65. Id.
66. Wackernagel, supra note 62, at 1.
67. Id. at 2
68. Id.
69. See South Africa: A Trade Strategy that Dreams of Jobs, AFR. NEWS SERV., Sept.
18, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 17256788.
70. VeldCom, THE ECONOMIST, May 16, 1998, at 64. The Economist reported that in
March 1998, a U.S. company, SBC Communications of San Antonio, Texas, acquired an
18% share of Telkom. See id. According to the report, SBC stands to profit handsomely
from the acquisition, if current market trends are any indication, in large part because of
growing South African consumer demand for mobile phones. The Economist report states:
The bright spot for Telkom is mobiles. Since 1993, when the devices
were first licensed, the number of users has rocketed from 12,500 to
about 1.6 m, making South Africa one of the world's largest markets
for mobile phones outside the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development]. In a country where public phones are
almost non-existent (people steal them for their value as scrap metal),
the cellphone is a must for the well-off and a status symbol for every-
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partial privatization.7 1
As stated, South Africa has made itself more attractive for FDI not
only because it wants FDI, but also because it needs it. FDI is a corner-
stone of the government's approach to economic development. In the
past, during decades spent in exile or in jail ANC leaders espoused so-
cialist ideals.72 But contrary to conventional expectations, the ANC
since coming to power in 1994 has committed South Africa to conserva-
tive economic policies, such as deficit reduction.7 3 Toward that end the
government would like to create jobs for the black population, but it
cannot expand the civil service payroll as a means of reducing unem-
ployment.74 Due in part to the current lack of FDI, however, some gov-
ernment intervention has been required.75 The primary governmental
initiative designed to address the inequalities created by apartheid is
the Reconstruction and Development Program ("RDP").76
So far, the RDP has emphasized the redirection of current govern-
ment spending rather than new expenditures. The government, since
1996, has been trying to reduce the deficit to 3% of its gross domestic
product ("GDP") by the year 2000, down from 5.2% in 1996. 77 This
commits the government to a difficult and dangerous balancing act. On
the one hand, it must hold spending to levels that will make South Af-
rica attractive to foreign investors. On the other, it must improve black
living conditions enough to avoid political unrest until such time as the
benefits of increased FDI can be realized. It is only through increased
FDI that the South African GDP can grow between 5% and 6% annu-
ally, the rate required to significantly reduce the high rate of black un-
employment.7 8 As one analyst has concluded, "[p]rivate sector growth is
one else. Nervous drivers like to know they can call for help if they
break down somewhere dangerous. A recent letter to the Sowetan
raged against immoral township girls who sleep with any man who
owns a mobile phone.
Telkom is one of two mobile providers. It is a partner of Britain's Vo-
daphone in a joint venture called Vodacom, which claims millions of
subscribers. Its estimated pre-tax profits are 500 million rand
($100m) on sales of perhaps 1.8 billion rand [$360 million]. MTN, the
other mobile firm, with fewer customers, but wealthier ones, probably
has similar revenues. The good times are likely to continue ....
Id.
71. See, e.g., Mandela Says Foundations Laid for a Better Life, but Admits Problems,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 7, 1997, at 1, available in WL 2/7/97 DCHPA.
72. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I.
73. Id.
74. Brent, supra note 21, at 116.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 114.
77. See Ashurst, supra note 52, at 4.
78. See Brent, supra note 21, at 116. The government has already demonstrated its
resolve to avoid inflating the civil service or having a fire sale of all of the parastatals.
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the only long-term solution for South Africa's economic straits. But to
generate the political capital necessary to pursue long-term growth, the
government will have to combine economic liberalization with effective
interventions to help the black majority."79
Additionally the government must decide whether to focus on capi-
tal intensive, as opposed to labor intensive, FDI. The two are antitheti-
cal. Capital intensive production methods utilize the most advanced
equipment and technology to decrease labor costs, whereas labor inten-
sive methods are ordinarily used when there is insufficient capital to
invest in the latest technological advances. On the one hand, South Af-
rica needs to update its technological infrastructure. In the long run,
capital intensive production methods will make South African products
more competitive and thus expand export markets. Conversely, how-
ever, labor intensive FDI would reduce black unemployment-at least
in the short-run-which appears to be an economic and political im-
perative. For this reason the government has introduced tax breaks for
labor intensive industries.
Fortunately, opinion polls indicate that South Africa's black popu-
lation does not seek immediate payoffs, but is willing to endure incre-
mental change for small but tangible improvements now, combined
with the realistic possibility of a better life for black children.8 0 Ac-
cording to one observer, South Africa's black communities have shown
"little evidence of populist factions in revolt against the compromises of
the new government."'s However, if neighboring Zimbabwe's experi-
ence is any indication, the South African government may have no more
than a ten-year window of opportunity to make significant changes.8 2
Yet South Africa's domestic economy cannot provide the capital necessary to develop jobs
because there is a drastic shortage of savings, from which domestic capital investment
normally comes; productivity of domestic industries is weak; and the skill level of the
work force is low. See id. at 115. Therefore, it is only through FDI that South Africa can
acquire the technical and capital revitalization to improve its export production and grow
its economy to reduce the number of unemployed.
79. Id. at 114.
80. See id. at 117.
81. Id. at 113. Apparently most whites feel the same way. Brent states:
Since the [1994] election, the once-feared threat of right-wing violence
has faded. Although extremist Eugene Terre'blanche of the Afrikaner
Resistance Movement still appears on his horse from time to time,
most conservative Afrikaners accept the new government, which
President Mandela has made easier for them by bending over back-
ward to respond to white concerns.
Id.
82. See id. at 116-17. In 1980, the people of Zimbabwe were willing to accept slow
economic progress, but when by 1994 they had not experienced significant changes in
black participation in the economy through business ownership, there was a backlash
against the government. See id. Even though the government of Zimbabwe succeeded in
correcting many social welfare problems, and increased black employment by the govern-
ment, it failed to provide measures to encourage black business ownership and reduce
1999
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As stated, the South African government cannot provide the neces-
sary type of long term improvements for blacks without significant con-
tributions from the private sector through FDI. In addition, white
South Africans must realize and accept that their expectations must
change. Whites no longer live under a regime which benefits them at
the expense of others, as did apartheid, a system which, as one writer
put it, "oppressed the majority of South Africans for the enrichment of a
few."8 3 To avoid turmoil and unrest, the government will have to keep
all sectors of the economy focused on the long term growth that will
provide jobs and allow for the development of the black community.8 4
Aside from the economic issues that concern foreign investors, the
political question of who and what will come after Nelson Mandela lin-
gers. His ANC will clearly remain the majority political group. Going
into the 1999 elections, the ANC controls over 60% of the seats in par-
liament.8 5 The question is whether the ANC will be able to govern ef-
fectively and responsibly without Mandela.
It is possible. Mandela is not as important to the day-to-day opera-
tion of the government as would seem at first blush.8 6 His importance
derives from his moral integrity and ability to unify various factions.8 7
His nation and the world have clung to him as a "saint-like figure," both
while he was in prison and since his release.8 8 One observer has de-
scribed him as "among the planet's foremost moral authorities."89 Man-
dela has devoted most of his life, including nearly 30 years in prison, to
the struggle against apartheid. 90 As an ANC leader, he came to under-
stand the ways in which the colored, Asian, and white communities, as
well as blacks, were denigrated by apartheid, and that therefore South
Africa itself was the victim.9 1 He has championed South Africa as a
white control of the economy. See id. Instead, the Zimbabwean government settled for
alleviating black unemployment through government jobs and benefits. See id.
83. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Facing the Truth in South Africa, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
1998, at C7.
84. See Brent, supra note 21, at 117. 'The challenge for the [South African] govern-
ment is to keep the focus on long-term growth but provide enough benefits to the majority
population along the way that political consensus can be maintained and moral commit-
ments protected." Id.
85. Lansing & King, supra note 46, at 759. Next in parliamentary representation are
the New National Party and the IFP. Other political parties in the South African parlia-
ment are the Freedom Front, the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the
African Christian Democratic Party. Id.
86. After He's Gone, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at 17.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. James Bennet, The Testing of a President: The Visitor; Mandela, at White House,
Says World Backs Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at A26.
90. See generally, MANDELA, supra note 31 (describing Mandela's life and career, in-
cluding his years in prison).
91. See id.
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place of equality for all people, regardless of race, and he has promoted
reconciliation.
This ability to understand, without necessarily agreeing with or ex-
cusing the behavior of all concerned, has made Mandela a person with
whom the leaders of the different racial groups have been able to
achieve compromise. Mandela demonstrated this ability by insisting
that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezei, and the Inkatha Freedom Party
("IFP") which he leads, be included in the transitional government of
national unity that drafted the new constitution. Buthelezi and the IFP
had opposed the ANC throughout the struggle against apartheid. 92
Mandela's conciliatory attributes were also reflected in the strong sup-
port for the new constitution demonstrated by the white-dominated
New Nationalist Party, the modern incarnation of the Nationalist Party
that institutionalized apartheid in 1948.
Yet South Africa's future cannot depend solely on one man. No one
understands this better than Mandela himself, who will be 80 years old
when his term of office expires in 1999, and has made clear that he will
not run for a second term of office. 93 Besides, while his moral courage
and efforts to lead South Africa out of apartheid should be lauded, his
skills as president should not be held out as perfect or otherworldly.
His tenure was successful in the broadest possible sense: he trans-
formed his country from "a racist, pariah state to a major, regional dip-
lomatic power."94 He can also take pride in the fact that his policies
"brought clean water to 3 million people and connected more than 2
million people to the electricity grid."95 Like other politicians, though,
Mandela has made mistakes and has been involved in funding as well
as personal scandals.9 6 Thus, his departure as president of South Af-
rica should not be viewed as an apocalypse.
Mandela has already delegated most of the daily running of the
government to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and has virtually
92. See Lansing & King, supra note 46.
Currently, there are nine major tribes in South Africa. The largest is
the Zulu tribe, which dominates the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
The second largest is the Xhosa tribe, which dominates the ANC (Nel-
son Mandela is a Xhosa prince). Historically, the Zulu and the Xhosa
have not gotten along. The antagonism between the tribes was used
by the white government in the 1970s and 1980s to promote division
among blacks, particularly between the IFP and the ANC.
Id. at 758. See also Kenneth D. Kaunda, The First Shall Be the Last: The African Na-
tional Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party Dispute, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 841, 842
(1993). Mr. Kaunda is former president of Zambia.
93. After He's Gone, supra note 86, at 17.
94. Daniel J. Wakin, Mandela: "Long Walk" Is Not Over, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 5,1999,
available in 1999 WL 11925039.
95. Id.
96. After He's Gone, supra note 86, at 17.
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anointed Mbeki as his successor. 97 As long as Mandela is in the back-
ground and participating in the ANC, even if he no longer holds a gov-
ernmental office, Mbeki's transition to power should be smooth. Once
in office Mbeki must show that he, too, can be a consensus builder. He
must also be able to control the more radical elements within the ANC,
a tough job if the promised improvements in black living conditions are
not forthcoming.
Mbeki has worked with former South African president F. W. de
Klerk, Chief Buthelezei, and other leading economic ministers on the
economic council that guides the growth of South Africa's economy.
98
An economist by training, Mbeki was educated in the United Kingdom,
and spent many years in exile in the former Soviet Union during the
apartheid era. 99 To his advantage, he has impeccable credentials
within the ANC.100 In 1997 Fikile Bam, a judge who was imprisoned
with Mandela on Robben Island, described Mbeki to an interviewer as a
courteous man, "good at economic issues and foreign policy."11 Bam
went on to speculate that Mbeki might even be able to handle the
"wealth gap" better than Mandela. 10 2 Like Mandela, Mbeki focuses on
economic liberalization. 10 3 His designation as Mandela's "heir appar-
ent" should comfort the white population, the ANC, and the interna-
tional community as a whole because he will probably not seek to make
any dramatic changes in the policies followed by Mandela's govern-
ment.10
4
Besides, South Africa's future as a pluralistic democracy lies not in
any one man's ability to govern, but rather first and foremost in the
new South African constitution, which is the culmination of all the
goals and aspirations Mandela has for a racially tolerant South Af-
rica.1 05 When he signed the document into law on December 10, 1996,
in Sharpeville, site of the dastardly massacre that became the rallying
cry of the anti-apartheid movement, "Mandela's pen brought to life
long-dreamed-of guarantees of racial equality and cultural protection,
as well as freedom of expression, association and religion, in one of the
world's most liberal constitutions."10 6 Ultimately, it will take the suc-
cess of that constitution to alleviate the lingering concerns of current
97. See id.
98. See Brent, supra note 21, at 117-18.
99. See Anthony Lewis, Part Democrat/Part Autocrat; Mandela the Pol, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Mar. 23, 1997, at 44; Hilfe Country Report, supra note 54, at 8.
100. See Hilfe Country Report, supra note 54, at 8.
101. Lewis, supra note 99, at 44.
102. Id.
103. Hilfe Country Report, supra note 54, at 8.
104. Id.
105. How Wrong Is It Going?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at 23.
106. Lynne Duke, Hopes and History Mingle as Mandela Signs Charter: Ceremony
Held in Town of 1960 Massacre, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1996, at A19.
VOL. 27:3
1999 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
and prospective foreign investors.
In addition to the matters already discussed, there are other fears
which inhibit current and prospective FDI. These fears will have to be
addressed by the next South African government. Among them: trepi-
dation over the strength of South Africa's labor unions and the labor
movement's alliance with the ANC;10 7 the limited availability of quali-
fied black managers and executives;1 08 the manner in which established
South African conglomerates might act to protect their home markets
from foreign "intruders;"10 9 and worries over South Africa's high crime
rate."10
In regard to South African crime, the random and violent nature of
it seems to be its most abhorrent aspect."' The government can, how-
ever, claim some success in the war against it. For instance, recent sta-
tistics show that the South African murder rate has declined steadily
since 1994.112 Nevertheless, in his final state of the nation speech to
parliament in February 1999, Mandela felt compelled to address the
crime problem. He assured his countrymen, "[t]he battle against crime
has been joined and we have no doubts at all who the victors will be."113
107. See generally Eric Taylor, The History of Foreign Investment and Labor Law in
South Africa and the Impact on Investment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 611 (1996) (for a discussion of South Africa's labor laws and the rela-
tionship between the South African labor movement and the ANC).
108. For a discussion of South Africa's efforts to include blacks in the executive and
managerial job market, see Lynne Duke, South African Blacks Lag in Job Market Despite
Gain in Political Power, WASH. POST, July 14, 1996, at A24.
109. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I. This concern over possible protectionist behavior
by existing South African conglomerates is best-addressed by the government's adherence
to the National Treatment Obligation (NTO). South Africa committed itself to NTO,
which prohibits discriminatory differentiation between foreign and domestic enterprises,
when it joined GATT and the WTO. For a discussion of South Africa's ideological com-
mitment to NTO, see Mandela, supra note 2, at 95. "Foreign companies should be treated
as domestic companies, obeying our laws and gaining access to our incentives, and the
ANC is committed to the principle of uniform treatment." Id.
110. See Mallet, supra note 14, at I. According to The Economist, a combination of fac-
tors account for the rise in South African crime. One is that South Africa's criminal jus-
tice system is a weak and relatively ineffective relic of the bygone apartheid era. See How
Wrong Is It Going?, supra note 105, at 21. Another is that organized crime has infiltrated
the country, and South Africa has become a money laundering center, as well as a trans-
shipment point for illegal drugs and stolen cars. See id. at 22.. Analysts differ as to the
crime rate's impact on FDI. Some feel that the high crime rate makes foreign executives
and their workers reluctant to relocate to South Africa. See, e.g., Mallet, supra note 14, at
I. Others say that crime, in and of itself, "probably does not deter foreign investors much:
if there is money to be made or a market to conquer, businessmen will go there." How
Wrong Is It Going?, supra note 105, at 22. Even this latter group concedes, however, that
at the very least, crime reduces tourism. See id.
111. How Wrong Is It Going?, supra note 105, at 22.
112. See Mandela: 'Long Walk'Is Not Over, supra note 94.
113. Suzanne Daley, Mandela, in Last State of the Nation Speech, Pleads for Peace,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A3.
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By far the greatest obstacle facing South Africa, however, is the
burden of its past: the political, economical, racial, and other wounds
that are apartheid's bitter legacy. South Africa is taking steps to over-
come its past. The government established the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission in 1994 to chronicle human rights abuses committed
during the apartheid era. Chaired by Nobel peace laureate Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, the Commission has been "generally regarded as a suc-
cessful instrument of national reconciliation."'114 The Commission's
guiding philosophical principle, "promoted as a model for nations
emerging from internal conflict, was that the full public exposure of po-
litical crimes was preferable to mass criminal prosecutions as a way of
putting the past to rest."'1 5 In other words, by granting amnesty in ex-
change for information, the Commission has encouraged human rights
violators to come forward and disclose their crimes in order to bring cer-
tainty and closure to the families of their victims, and to the nation as a
whole. Archbishop Tutu has described the Commission's objective and
purpose as follows:
We are saying people who have committed horrendous acts,
demonic acts, monstrous acts, are not monsters, are not de-
mons. They remain human beings. We don't say that because
you are a perpetrator, therefore you remain a perpetrator for-
ever. We say that there is a possibility of changing.. .We-we
are hoping that white people will, when they hear the stories,
say, 'Isn't that incredible?' 'Aren't we lucky that black people
are not wanting to treat us as we treated them?' I'm saying,
white people, please, can you hear the generosity that is being
offered you? Can you hear our people saying, 'Despite the-
the agony that you have caused us, we want to be friends with
you'?l
1 6
But the Commission has not restricted its investigations to human
rights abuses committed by whites. Instead, it has endeavored to strike
a balance between those on both sides of the anti-apartheid struggle.
As President Mandela has stated, "[w]e believe that a government of
national unity should be even-handed and grant amnesty, not only to
those who committed offenses in their opposition to apartheid, but also
to those who committed offenses in defense of apartheid." 117 As an un-
fortunate result of the Commission's even-handedness, neither the ANC
114. Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
591, 610 (1998).
115. Lynne Duke, South African Report Draws Bitterness: Apartheid Probe's Findings
Anger ANC and Former Leaders, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1998, at Al.
116. Interview with Archbishop Desmond Tutu,60 Minutes: Forgive but Not Forget
(CBS television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1997), available in 1997 WL 7899905.
117. Steven A. Holmes, South Africa Panel to Probe Political Violence, Hous. CHRON.,
June 8, 1994, at 15.
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nor the country's former white rulers were pleased by its report issued
in October, 1998. The 3,500-page document described the nation's for-
mer white leaders as "perpetrators of gross human rights viola-
tions .. ."118 But the document also "attacked the claim to the nation's
moral high ground by the ANC, which led the struggle against apart-
heid."11 9
For all its good intentions, it remains to be seen whether the Com-
mission's work will produce the longed for reconciliation of South Af-
rica's racial groups. As one legal scholar has explained:
Truth commissions do not produce full justice. They are not intended
to. Nor will a truth commission reveal the whole truth. But, then
again, it could not have been expected to. Reconciliation will stay in-
complete, and so, too, will the hope for justice. Forgiveness, not justice,
is the price deemed necessary if a truth commission is to help heal a
society of the pain and suffering brought about by internal war and
violent ethnic strife. And this poses the crux of the dilemma: Should
those who perpetrate the most terrible of crimes escape punishment, at
the price only of admitting their guilt by showing remorse? For the ex-
perience chosen by South Africa, the price of peace and reconciliation is
"the truth" with amnesty. It is neither justice nor compensation. How
well forgiveness actually works as a strategy for fostering political sta-
bility will only be seen in coming years. 120
In the meantime, Mandela has expressed the need for what in ef-
fect amounts to a reconstruction and development program for the
South African soul. 121 In his final state of the nation address, the out-
going president lamented lingering racial animosities, especially those
harbored by whites, and issued a call for all South Africans to rise in
support of their new democratic government. He complained:
We slaughter one another in the stereotypes and mistrust that
linger in our heads.., and the words of hate we spew from our
lips. We slaughter one another in the responses that some of
us give to efforts aimed at bettering the lives of the poor. We
slaughter one another and our country by the manner in
which we exaggerate our weaknesses to the wider world, he-
roes of the gab who astound their foreign associates by their
self-flagellation.122
Mandela went on to challenge South Africans to take responsibility
for themselves. He declared:
118. Duke, supra note 115, at Al.
119. Id.
120. Joyner, supra note 114, at 610.
121. Daley, supra note 113, at A3.
122. Id.
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Quite clearly there is something wrong with a society where
freedom is interpreted to mean that teachers or students get to
school drunk; warders chase away management and appoint
their own friends to lead institutions; striking workers resort
to violence and destruction of property; business people lavish
money in court cases simply to delay implementation of legis-
lation they do not like; and tax evasion turns individuals into
heroes of dinner-table talk ....
Something drastic needs to be done about this ... South Afri-
can society-in its schools and universities, in the workplace,
in the sports, in professional work and all areas of social inter-
action-needs to infuse itself with a measure of discipline, a
work ethic and responsibility for the actions we undertake. 123
The Clinton administration has expressed a desire for South Africa
to succeed in achieving the democracy and prosperity to which it as-
pires, and has pledged U.S. support. In fact, in 1998 Clinton announced
that the administration would like to make South Africa the centerpiece
of its new African trade policy. 124 The U.S. has recognized that a stable
and prosperous South Africa is crucial to continent-wide democratiza-
tion and development. South Africa has already taken the lead in es-
tablishing regional free trade arrangements from which all of southern
Africa stands to benefit. These include the South African Development
Community (SADC); the South African Customs Union (SACU); and a
bilateral trade agreement with Zambia. 125 Commentators have sum-
marized U.S. strategic interests in South Africa as follows:
If South Africa achieves the economic and political potential
within its grasp, it will be a wellspring of regional political
stability and economic growth. If it prospers, it can demon-
strate to other ethnically tortured regions a path to stability
through democratization, reconciliation, and steadily increas-
ing living standards. Alternatively, if it fails to handle its
many challenges, it will suck its neighbors into a whirlpool of
self-defeating conflict.
Although controlling the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good
Hope would be important, especially if widespread trouble
were to erupt in the Middle East, American strategic interests
are not otherwise endangered in southern Africa. Yet because
South Africa is the United States' largest trading partner in
Africa and possesses vast economic potential, its fate would af-
123. Id.
124. For a discussion of U.S. trade policy toward Africa, see Hunter R. Clark, African
"Renaissance" and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265 (1999).
125. See Lynda Loxton, South Africa Trade Agreements Are on a Roll, AFR. NEWS
SERV.; Nov. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14178461.
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fect American trading and financial interests that have in-
vested there. It would also destabilize key commodity prices,
especially in gold, diamond, and ore markets. More generally,
instability in South Africa, as in Brazil and Indonesia, would
cast a large shadow over confidence in emerging markets.
American policy toward South Africa should reflect its impor-
tance as a pivotal state. While recognizing South Africa's de-
sire to solve its problems without external interference, the
United States should promote South Africa's economic and po-
litical stability. 126
No wonder, therefore, that on March 26, 1998, while visiting Africa
to promote his African trade policy, President Clinton told the South
African parliament, "America has a profound and pragmatic stake in
your success-an economic stake because we, like you, need strong
partners to build prosperity...." 127 He concluded, "Simply put, Amer-
ica wants a strong South Africa; America needs a strong South Africa.
And we are determined to work with you to build a strong South Af-
rica." 128
For South Africa's sake, and for their own gain, foreign investors
will, hopefully, come to share President Clinton's point of view.
In conclusion, South Africa's post-apartheid government is commit-
ted to FDI as a cornerstone of its economic development policies. So far,
however, South Africa has failed to attract the level of FDI it needs and
wants. The government has therefore taken steps to allay concerns of
current and prospective foreign investors. These steps include tariff re-
duction; the privatization of state-run industries; monetary policies de-
signed to attract FDI; increased worker productivity; and lowering the
South African crime rate.
In order to avoid social unrest, the South African government has
126. Robert S. Chase et al., Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 11,
1996, at 45-46.
127. Address by the President of the United States to the Parliament of South Africa
(Mar. 27, 1998), available in 1998 WL 138738.
128. Id. See also Albright Says South Africa Is a Model for Ties with U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1997, at 6. "Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright today held up the United
States' relationship with South Africa as an example of the type of ties it wants with
countries across Africa." Id. This is not to suggest that the U.S. and South Africa agree
on all matters. For example, the two nations have failed to reach accord on a bilateral
investment treaty. This is in part because South Africa insists on maintaining an inde-
pendent trade policy that includes relations with nations like Cuba, Iran, and Libya, with
which the U.S. is at odds. See R. W. Apple Jr., From Mandela, a Gentle Admonishment,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at A2. Mandela has told Clinton that "we [South Africans]
resist any attempt by any country to impose conditions on our freedom of trade." Charles
William Maynes, The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America, 111 FOREIGN POL'Y. 36, 44
(1998).
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also instituted the Reconstruction and Development Program to im-
prove black living conditions and reduce black unemployment, without
substantially increasing government spending. For example, the gov-
ernment is providing tax incentives for labor intensive industries in or-
der to help alleviate unemployment.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the government is
moving to reduce the lingering racial animosities that are the legacy of
apartheid. The nation seems poised for a smooth transfer of power in
1999 from retiring President Nelson Mandela to his deputy, Thabo
Mbeki. Indications are that Mbeki will continue the policies Mandela
set in motion aimed at economic liberalization, democratization, and ra-
cial reconciliation.
Lastly, the U.S. has expressed its support for a strong South Africa
that will emerge as a democratic, stabilizing force regionally and conti-
nent-wide. As this in fact occurs, investor confidence should grow along
with foreign direct investment in South Africa.
